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DOES THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE STILL EXIST?
(WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE ABOUT?)
Abstract
The author of this study has been dealing with this topic for several years. He raises 
the following right questions: does the intelligence cycle still exist, how did the intelligence 
cycle develop and change, what are the real elements of this cycle, which is the content of the 
request for information (RFI), what are the reasons for the rivalry between the information 
collectors and the analysts, who are the main critics of the intelligence cycle, what is the 
essence of their criticism, what are the contradictions between the political decision makers 
and the analysts. The author answers all these questions and draws the final conclusion that 
although the intelligence cycle functions in a different way in theory and in practice, there is 
still a need for the cycle to produce good intelligence products and provide the personnel with 
an efficient intelligence training. 
Keywords: intelligence cycle, data collection, analyses and assessment, policy makers 
and analysts, criticisms of the cycle, main elements of the cycle, evolution of the cycle, 
request for information (RFI), further need for the cycle. 
In the Hungarian society and scientific circles there is a lot of misunderstandings about 
the function of the national security system; and the cause of this should be examined from 
two viewpoints. First, the society identifies the national security system with the scandals and 
the abuses of the last decades, and with the activities of the state security services of the pre-
1989 regime, because the media can only hammer this in the minds of people, due to the 
mysteriousness that surrounds the national security services. Second, the domestic literature 
available for everyone is extremely insufficient. This also applies to the theoretical bases of 
national security intelligence and counter- intelligence activities. 
Regarding the theory of intelligence, especially the analysis and assessment activities, 
I have already pointed out this insufficiency in my study1 entitled 0ĦYpV]HWYDJ\WXGRPiQ\
* The author wrote his study under the support of the MTA Bolyai János Kutatási Ösztöndíj (János Bolyai 
Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
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*RQGRODWRN D KtUV]HU]Ę HOemzés-pUWpNHOpVUĘO (Art or Science: Thoughts about Intelligence 
Analysis and Assessment) >)HOGHUtWĘ6]HPOH,QWHOOLJHQFH5HYLHZ-4.].
After the publication of the article, based on my research about the theory of national 
security intelligence, I had to state that there are some similarities not only in the case of 
analysis and assessment, but also in the case of the theory of national security intelligence 
itself. This is supported by the fact that one of the well-known search engines2 on the Internet 
found only nine Hungarian results when searching for “intelligence cycle” as the description 
of the process of intelligence, while in English3 there are 427,000 results for the same term4. 
Among the Hungarian results, there was only one that had the intelligence cycle as its main 
topic, which was published by Dr. Péter Fenyves 5, under the title $ KtUV]HU]Ę FLNOXV (The 
Intelligence Cycle) 6.
In this study the author examined the elements of the intelligence cycle in the case of 
different foreign national security services, and in the end, he introduced his own version of 
the intelligence cycle. The author undertook only the task to introduce shortly the cycle, and 
he did not analyse its particulars or potential problems. The other results only touched upon
the notion of intelligence cycle, but did not describe in detail its real meaning. Despite the 
insufficient literature, several higher education institutions teach the intelligence cycle 7.
Based on the scientific journals and magazines 8, it can be stated that in open sources, 
most of those who deals with the theory of national security intelligence are representatives of 
the military sciences. In Hungary, there is scientific literature for the theory of intelligence 
besides the open sources, because the national security services do have their own broad 
scientific description of their activity systems. However, these texts are still considered 
confidential information, despite the fact that in the international literature the theoretical 
questions can be easily found.
1 Dr. Csaba Vida: 0ĦYpV]HWYDJ\WXGRPiQ\*RQGRODWRNDKtUV]HU]ĘHOHP]pV-pUWpNHOpVUĘO$UWRU6FLHQFH
Thoughts about Intelligence Analysis and Assessment) pp. 140-141
2 Google Search Engine, www.google.hu
3 Term searched for in Hungarian: „h írszerzési ciklus”, in English: „intelligence cycle”
4 Date of access: Aug 1, 2013
5 Ret ired Colonel Dr. Péter Fenyves, who has CSc in military science, expert at the Hungarian Association of 
Military Science, former associate at the Hungarian Military Intelligence Office, former defense, military and air 
attaché in Ankara.
6 Colonel Dr. Péter Fenyves: $KtUV]HU]ĘFLNOXV (The Intelligence Cycle), pp. 66-75.
7 Dr. Csaba Vida: 0ĦYpV]HWYDJ\WXGRPiQ\*RQGRODWRNDKtUV]HU]ĘHOHP]pV-pUWpNHOpVUĘO p. 147.
8 Periodicals considered scientific by the different committees of the MTA (Hungarian Academy of Sciences). In 
PLOLWDU\VFLHQFHVWKHVHDUHWKHIROORZLQJ+DGWXGRPiQ\ÒM+RQYpGVpJL6]HPOH)HOGHUtWĘ6]HPOH6]DNPDL
Szemle, Hadtudományi Szemle, Belügyi Szemle, etc.
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In contrast with the Hungarian literature, the international, especially the English 
literature is extremely broad, and in the last decade a significant number of studies have been 
published in connection with the national security activity. These precisely elaborate on the 
theories of national security and the factors connected to the intelligence cycle as well. Based 
on these, the scientific debates surrounding the national security intelligence can be kept track 
of, as well as the debates about the intelligence cycle.
The Evolution of the Intelligence Cycle
The intelligence cycle describes the process of national security intelligence activities, 
which is present at every organization (government institutions and private companies) where 
people gather information. Despite this, the system of the intelligence cycle only took shape 
by the mid-20th century. The definition of the elements of military intelligence appeared in 
U.S. regulations around WWI9, which defined the tasks of data collection, comparison and 
dissemination. After WWI, four elements of intelligence were identified: requests for 
information (RFI), collection of data, analysis and dissemination. The full system of 
intelligence emerged during WWII, which is well supported by the fact that after the war, the 
theory of the intelligence cycle was formulated and published by Robert Rigby Glass and 
Phillip B. Davidson in 1948 in their book entitled Intelligence is For Commanders10. They 
described the intelligence cycle as a cyclical process, in which the mission (cycle) has four 
elements: directing data collection efforts, gathering information, analysing information and 
utilizing the products of intelligence. When examining the origins of the intelligence cycle, 
Michael Warner 11 stated that the formation of the concept should be basically sought at the 
points of contact between military sciences and psychology, but in any case it originates from 
social sciences. After the description and definition of the cycle, the concept quickly spread 
among the international intelligence community, and thus it became the generally accepted 
model of intelligence. This is supported by the fact that this is also the base for intelligence12
at the renowned intelligence services 13. The system of the intelligence cycle solidified at the 
end of the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s, and it is still considered the classical 
version.
9 Kristan J. Wheaton: Let’s Kill the Intelligence Cycle. http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.hu/2011/05/lets-kill-
intelligence-cycle-original.html, date of access: 14 Ju ly, 2013.
10 Robert R. Glass – Phillip B. Davidson: Intelligence is for Commanders.
11 Michael Warner was a fo rmal associate of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who worked at the 
processing and analysing institution of the CIA, and later he engaged in the history of CIA.
12 Colonel Dr. Péter Fenyves: $KtUV]HU]ĘFLNOXV pp. 66-75.
13 American, British, German and French.
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The cycle went though smaller changes in the last decades as a result of the 
development in information technology and information society, which manifested mainly in 
the breaking up of the working process. In the beginning of the 21st century, some 
representatives of the national security theory consider the intelligence cycle a “Cyclops”14, 
because they think that nowadays it describes the process of intelligence defectively. Among 
the circles of the U.S. national security theories, a scientific debate developed in 2006 and 
200715 in connection with the intelligence cycle. The leader of this debate was Arthur S. 
Hulnick16, who wrote that “the description of the process is not good, based on which the 
intelligence process is working”17. Presenting the opinion of American intelligence officers, 
Robert M. Clark 18 in his 2010 study19 explains that “…the intelligence cycle has become only 
a theoretical concept … Many intelligence officers admit that the intelligence process ‘in 
reality, does not work like that.’ In other words, effective intelligence efforts are not 
cycles.”20 Mark M. Lowenthal21 analyses the system of the intelligence cycle in the fourth 
chapter of his book entitled Intelligence: From Secret to Policy22, and points out that in his 
opinion, the process of intelligence is not a cycle, but a linear process realising on different 
levels as a result of constant feedback. Experts 23 participating in the relevant scientific debate 
also formulated several arguments against the intelligence cycle, claiming that it does not 
cover the whole process of intelligence.
Description of the Intelligence Cycle
After analysing the defects of the intelligence cycle, we need to discuss what the cycle 
in fact is. The cycle is a complex description of the intelligence activity, which includes the 
14 Kristan J. Wheaton: Let’s Kill the Intelligence Cycle. http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.hu/2011/05/lets-kill-
intelligence-cycle-original.html, date of access: 14 Ju ly, 2013.
15 The source of the debate was a 2006 study by Arthur S. Hulnick entit led What’s Wrong with the Intelligence 
Cycle?
16 Arthur S. Huln ick spent 35 years in the profession of intelligence, worked as an intelligence officer in the U.S. 
Air Force and for the CIA. Since 1989 he has been working at the University of Boston. His main research topic 
is strategic intelligence.
17 Julian Richards: The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis, p. 9.
18 Robert M. Clark served at the U.S. A ir Force, and then worked for different intelligence services for 42 years. 
He is currently a professor of the University of Mary land and the Intelligence and Security Academy.
19 Robert M. Clark: Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric Approach.
20 Robert M. Clark: Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric Approach, p. 11.
21 Mark M. Lowenthal was the professor of John Hopkins University and the University of Columbia, previously 
worked for 36 years for d ifferent intelligence services, and worked as an expert for Congress.
22 Mark M. Lowenthal: Intelligence: From Secret to Policy, pp. 57-70.
23 Besides the above mentioned persons, Geraint Evans (intelligence officer of the Brit ish army), Lisa M. 
Palmieri (associate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), Julian Richards (professor of the University 
of Buckingham), among others.
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process and system of information gathering, and the main aim of these is to support policy 
makers (users 24) with information. Furthermore, it has early warning and forecasting tasks in 
certain security issues defined by the decision makers.
Currently, there are several versions of the intelligence cycle, which usually differ in the 
number or in the names of the stages of the cycle. The literature considers the five-element 
system as the classical version, which consists of the acceptance of requests for information 
(1), the data collection (2), the data processing (3), the analysis and assessment (4) and the 
dissemination (5).
The acceptance of requests for information stage is a much more complex element 
of the process than its name suggests, because this stage starts at the users’ level25, when they 
determine their requests for information and send it to the competent intelligence 
organization. At the intelligence agencies, these requests are interpreted first, then intelligence 
is designed and organized, and the data collecting organizations are tasked and directed.
User’s requests for information must be interpreted first from the intelligence point of view, 
because the users (mainly politicians, who are not experts at intelligence) do not formulate 
their questions in the language of intelligence. As a result, these have to be “translated”, so 
that the data collectors and processors and sometimes the analysts can convert them into their 
own task systems. After identifying the questions, the competent organization plans and 
organizes the fulfilment of the RFI and examines whether the required information is already 
in the hands of the intelligence service, or it should be collected by the data collectors. If new 
data is needed, those data collectors are selected, who can collect the required data based on 
their skills and characteristics. However, it should be kept in mind during the organisation of 
intelligence work that even the biggest services 26 have limited capabilities, thus the RFIs must 
be prioritised. During this process, the importance of the original user (in case of 
governmental services, the position that the user holds in the government), the significance of 
the required data and the probability of the collection of the data must be considered. 
Obviously, intelligence services want to fulfil every information demand, but their capabilities 
limit this ambition.
24 On the governmental level, the users are the members of the government, the heads of legislation, the directors 
of the central government offices and the commanders of the military and law enforcement organizations. In 
business intelligence, the users are the customers, who are usually the directors of different companies.
25 Users of the informat ion include political and military leaders and the directors of the central government 
organizations.
26 For instance, the CIA and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Serv ice employ thousands or tens of thousands of 
people.
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In order to successfully collect the required information, during the planning and 
organization process, it is necessary to designate the most appropriate data collector 
organisation. The aim of this is to increase the efficiency of intelligence, because every data 
collector organization has different information sources, thus they can collect different types 
of information. After the selection of the data collector organization, the actual data 
collection starts. Data collection can be complemented in different ways, differing in the tool, 
the method or the procedure used for gathering data. Based on this we differentiate the 
branches of intelligence, which have different capabilities and characteristics. According to 
Lowenthal, in the process of intelligence, the data collectors produce raw data and 
information27, but these cannot be considered as the products of intelligence28, because in 
most cases they are unintelligible for the users. The amount of raw information determines the 
success of intelligence. However, this does not mean that the data collectors have to collect as 
many data as possible, because it would lessen the probability of the successful fulfilment of 
the request for information. Too much and sometimes irrelevant information can hinder the 
success, because the data processors and analysts can only process and analyse limited 
amount of information. Data processors and analysts always have smaller capacities than data 
collectors, thus the data collectors can only feed information related to the defined topics into 
the process of intelligence. However, this narrowing constraint may define the success and 
efficiency of the services in every case. For the intelligence organization, only those data and 
information exist that was forwarded by the data collectors in the intelligence cycle, because 
those that were not forwarded cannot be included in the reports prepared for the users.
The next stage of the intelligence cycle is the processing and systematisation of the 
raw data and information. Processing of raw information is needed because the data collected 
through data collection, especially by technical means (signs, codes, pictures, measurement 
data) is not practicable for all-source analysis and assessment, and is not suitable for 
informing the users. Processing raw information might require special skills, for instance 
decryption capability, or knowledge of a special language. If the raw data is not processed, it 
is qualified as unusable in the intelligence process. During data processing, raw data gives 
birth to information, which needs to be systematized to duly support the analysis and 
27 Between data and information, the fo llowing distinction can be made: data is unintelligible for the analysts 
directly because it needs to be converted into information. Based on this, data can be signs, numerical data and 
measurement results collected from technical reconnaissance.
28 Mark M. Lowenthal: Intelligence: From Secret to Policy, p. 57.
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assessment. During the systematisation, information is recorded, grouped and selected, and 
the filling of intelligence data stores starts.
After the processing and the systematisation, the next stage is analysis and 
assessment, which basically consists of two parts. In the first part, information is analysed 
and assessed, during which process the analysts define the cause and effect relations between 
the pieces of information, draw a conclusion and draft the predictions. For this, they use 
different analysis and assessment methods, which have three different types: the simple, 
logical analysis and assessment methods, the bound analysis and assessment methods and the 
complex analysis and assessment methods. 29 In the course of analysis and assessment, some 
information is analysed and assessed not only from one source, but from all available sources; 
this is called all-source analysis and assessment. After the analysis and assessment, raw and 
processed information go under a qualitative change, and thus become suitable for informing 
the users. Therefore, analysts can start the preparation of reports, which answers the users’ 
request for information. During the preparation of these reports, analysts take into 
consideration the original RFI to the largest possible extent.
After the reports (the products of intelligence) are prepared, the next stage is the 
dissemination of information, which can be written or oral. Intelligence services can produce 
a large number of intelligence products, which all serve the purpose of satisfying the users’ 
requests for information to an adequate degree. These RFIs are worded differently towards the 
intelligence services. The grouping of intelligence products is based on time, according to 
which the reports can be grouped as immediate reports, permanent and temporary reports, or 
long-run predictions that can be prepared for years. The method of informing the users raises 
an extremely important question: what kind of relationship is between policy makers and 
intelligence services, and how big the responsibility of intelligence organizations is. 30
The above-mentioned five stages are the components of the classical theory of the 
intelligence cycle, which is completed by the system of feedbacks. Feedbacks are present in 
every stage and between the stages as well. Their fundamental aim is to increase the 
efficiency of intelligence, and to provide the best possible answer for the users’ requests of 
information.
29 Find more informat ion about analysis and assessment methods in my study entitled 0ĦYpV]HWYDJ\WXGRPiQ\
*RQGRODWRNDKtUV]HU]ĘHOHP]pV-pUWpNHOpVUĘO$UWRU6FLHQFH7KRXJKWVDERXW,QWHOOLJHQFH$QDO\VLVDQG
Assessment).
30 Find more informat ion on this topic in Hadtudomány 2013/1-2. in my report entit led .RUV]HUĦHOHP]Ę-pUWpNHOĘ
eljárások alkalmazása a hírszerzésben (The Use of Modern Analysis and Assessment Methods in Intelligence).
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After the overview of the elements of the classical intelligence cycle, we need to 
answer the following question: who or which organization does operate the cycle? There are 
significant differences between the national security intelligence services in this regard, 
because in the case of services employing large numbers of people and operating on huge 
financial resources, a separate structural element engages itself in Collection Coordination 
and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM), which can be found in the U.S. and 
the NATO intelligence doctrines as well. In the case of intelligence organizations with a 
smaller number of employees and capabilities, two different methods can be distinguished. 
One solution is that the analysis and assessment organization defines the process of the 
intelligence cycle, because it is concerned in all the elements, and this intelligence 
organization knows what information is needed to answer the users’ requests for information. 
The second solution is that the management of the intelligence services operates the cycle, as 
a result of which the data collector, the data processor and the analysis and assessment 
organizations have a smaller scope for action. In these two cases, there is no significant 
difference in the operation of the intelligence cycle; there is only a slight difference in the 
independence of the different stages. In my opinion, if there is no possibility of establishing a 
CCIRM organization, than the analysis and assessment organization is the best for fulfilling 
this task.
Criticism of the intelligence cycle
Critics of the intelligence cycle concluded from the mistakes of intelligence, from their 
own personal experiences and the statements and recollections of the current and former 
employees of intelligence services that today the intelligence cycle is not operating 
sufficiently, thus it is not suitable for describing the process of intelligence. Problems pointed 
out by the above-mentioned critics can be divided into four groups. The first negates the 
existence of the intelligence cycle because (according to representatives of this group), it does 
not represent the real process of intelligence. The second group, although it accepts that the 
cycle in part represents the process of intelligence, but says that it is not a real cycle. The third 
group of critics attack the stages of the intelligence cycle, because they think that the function 
of the stages does not realize. The fourth group of critics states that some elements are 
missing from the cycle.
In the followings I will present these accusations, and will try to highlight their 
relevancy and irrelevancy in the case of the intelligence cycle, and I will suggest types of 
complements and modernization that could be done.
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Some tasks of intelligence are not executed within the intelligence cycle
Hulnick states based on his experiences at CIA31 that the intelligence cycle does not 
cover the whole spectrum of activities of intelligence services, because in the case of 
counterintelligence and covert and clandestine actions, the activities of the service do not 
happen on the basis of the cycle. Geraint Evans also highlights this problem in his work 
entitled Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure. 32 The American school of the theory of 
intelligence considers counterintelligence a part of intelligence, thus does not differentiate it 
from intelligence itself. However, when examining the theoretical activity of 
counterintelligence, it can be stated that – in contrast to the American theory and practice – it 
cannot be considered as a part of intelligence, because it has a different aim and a different 
purpose, and applies different procedures. At the same time, there are some similarities, 
especially when the counterintelligence organization does information-collecting activities, 
during which it also applies the intelligence cycle. The difference of the counterintelligence 
service is also supported by the fact that in several European countries33, intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities are managed by different organizations.
Covert and clandestine actions are considered intelligence operations by the classical 
theory of intelligence, which represent the special branches of intelligence, because these are
not always carried out with the aim of collecting information, but to cause disadvantage and 
loss to the target country, so that the target cannot assert its own interests and cannot protect 
its own values. Nowadays these include air strikes carried out by U.S. drones in Yemen and 
Pakistan, which belong to the actions of U.S. intelligence. However, these should be 
considered military actions rather than intelligence ones, despite the fact that the 
organisational element, which carries out these actions, belongs to the intelligence. 
Intelligence actions launched in the framework of information collecting do fit into the 
intelligence cycle because the collection of the required information can take place in the 
form of covert action, which – as data collection – is a part of the intelligence cycle. Based on 
these it can be stated that Hulnick’s viewpoint is only characteristic of some special tasks of 
the American intelligence services, while the intelligence cycle can describe their activities 
directly connected to intelligence or information collection, based on the classical theory of 
intelligence. Those that are not connected to information collection (as counterintelligence 
31 Arthur S. Huln ick: What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle? pp. 13-14.
32 Geraint Evans: Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure – Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle,
pp. 22-46.
33 Great Britain, France, Po land, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, etc.
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and intelligence actions carried out not in order to gather information) cannot be connected to 
the basic activities of intelligence.
Policy makers do not draft requests for information (RFIs)
In one of his criticisms 34, Hulnick attacks the present practice of drafting RFIs, which 
starts the intelligence cycle, because he refutes that the users of intelligence, namely the 
policy makers formulate questions towards intelligence services. In his opinion, the leaders 
(managers) of the services launch the intelligence cycle based on their own intuitions and the 
ensuing events. In this case, the aim of the leaders is to draw the attention of policy makers to 
the security problems threatening the country. Hulnick acknowledges that sometimes policy 
makers do give signs to the leaders of intelligence that they need information, but in his 
opinion these do not manifest in concrete questions. This leads back to the question of the 
depth of relationship between the intelligence leaders and the policy makers, because Hulnick 
thinks that the leaders of intelligence and the policy makers need to be in such a close 
relationship that the leaders have to know the problems of the policy makers, because 
intelligence has to answer these problems. In their studies they mention that other researchers 
also mention the lack of RFIs. For instance, Lowenthal writes about the vacuum of requests 
for information, when he asserts that policy makers assume that intelligence services know 
their demands, so they know what to do, and there is no need to word these demands.
When examining the questions of the lack of RFIs, the notion of RFI has to be defined, 
because the solution to the problem worded as criticism also lies here. There are different 
types of requests for information, because it does not limit itself to the written or oral 
questions of policy makers. RFIs can be laws, decrees, orders or temporary tasks connected to 
intelligence services and their activities, issued by policy makers and the legislature. For 
instance, based on the Act on the National Security Services 35, one task of the national 
security services is to “uncover the efforts indicative of offensive intention against the 
country”36, and this can be considered a request for information because the policy maker 
authorized by the legislature expects information in this topic from the intelligence services. 
Intelligence cycles launched by these laws are constantly present in the activities of the 
intelligence services, thus they operate as an independent cycle on their own. Besides the 
legal instruments, the public and private declarations by policy makers should be considered 
34 Arthur S. Huln ick: What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle? pp. 1-2.
35 In Hungary, national security services, therein the activit ies of intelligence services are regulated by Act 
CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services.
36 Art. 6 (a) of Act CXXV of 1995.
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also as RFIs, in which they outline the topics they engage themselves in. If these fit into the 
legal responsibilities of the given service, these requests need to be translated to the language 
of intelligence in the first stage of the intelligence cycle, and the intelligence cycle can start. 
Based on this, the leaders of the intelligence services not independently, but following the 
initiatives of the policy makers or the orders of law do they launch the cycle. Of course, the 
latter solution is not and ideal situation. To fully eliminate the problem, there can be only one 
solution: if the policy makers (within the legal framework) consciously use the intelligence 
services. Based on the above, policy makers formulate RFIs towards intelligence before every 
intelligence cycle, because if the cycle does not originate from the initiation of the policy 
makers, it questions the legality of the activities of the services.
Data collectors gather information independently
Hulnick’s next criticism is that data collectors function independently, do not wait for 
direction or RFIs; they make an effort to fill the gaps in the databases of intelligence. He 
supports this with the fact that information sources in the different branches of intelligence are 
not flexible, since sometimes it takes months or years to find the suitable sources.
When examining the above-mentioned problem, it can be stated that data collecting 
organizations – especially their technical elements – do not stop their activities when they 
answer a request for information, but continue them. However, the data collectors’ 
capabilities and sources are not formed independently, but on the basis of the fundamental
tasks, so that the subsequent concrete RFIs can be satisfied. Obviously, some foresight is 
needed from the part of the leaders of data collectors, but they have to work in a fixed system 
and have to answer the fresh RFIs. Acquiring new data sources or changing the direction of 
data collection can also happen in connection to the RFIs. Based on this, data collection is not 
a self-contained activity; it can only operate efficiently as part of the intelligence cycle. If data 
collection operates independently from the cycle, it engages its capacities in collecting such 
information that does not serve the operation of the intelligence service. However, we must 
mention the race between data collectors and analysts because Hulnick formulated his 
criticism as a data collector, and tried to highlight the priority of data collection. But this is 
not a good direction because all elements of the intelligence cycle are equally important. The 
data collector cannot live without the analyst, and vice versa. Based on Hulnick’s suggestions, 
we also have to mention the raw information, about which the data collectors (excluding the 
analysts) inform policy makers. This is mostly characteristic of information acquired through 
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human intelligence. Hulnick considers the procedure a faulty decision because a lot of raw 
data and information is incomplete, contradictory or defective. He regrets that in the case of 
certain services (countries) this procedure is inevitable because policy makers (with 
propagandistic aims) make prestige out of it. In my opinion, this significantly constrains the 
operation of the intelligence cycle, because if policy makers receive the given information at 
the same time as the analysts receive it, the latter get into a difficult situation, especially when 
the original information is not real.
The parallel activities of data collectors and analysts
Moving forward along the lines of the previous problem, Hulnick stated that the 
relationship between data collectors and analysts hinders the operation of the intelligence 
cycle because the two most important elements of the cycle do not operate in the defined 
stages of the cycle, but in parallel. This is the case indeed because the data collectors do not 
stop their sources because of the above-mentioned reasons, while after accepting the RFIs, the 
analysts start to prepare the answers, during which they first examine if the information is 
available in the data stores. According to Hulnick it can happen that there is no need for data 
collectors to elaborate an answer. However, this is a highly ideal case, but analysts can still 
turn to data collectors to verify, actualise or complete the previous information. Yet, the 
parallel work does not exclude the operation of the cycle.
The lack of the sharing of information
It was also Hulnick who worded the problems connected to the sharing of information, 
which is present within intelligence services. Data collectors often do not share all the 
information with the analysts because they are afraid that the analysts do not handle 
information suitably and might disclose their secret sources. Mistrust has mainly psychical 
reasons. According to Hulnick, this comes from the mistaken belief that the analysts are 
introverts, while operational data collectors are extroverts. This stereotype stuck so much in 
the minds of the two organizations during the years that it started to hinder the operation of 
the intelligence cycle.
In my opinion, the mistrust and the competition between data collectors and analysts 
hinder not the intelligence cycle, but the efficiency of intelligence services, because for the 
intelligence services the information that is not forwarded by data collectors towards the 
30
analysts does not exist, even if the raw information is directly given to policy makers, because
that cannot be considered the end product of intelligence.
Some intelligence products are not the results of the intelligence cycle
According to Hulnick, the most widespread and popular products of intelligence 
services are the daily intelligence reports. Every policy makers’ day starts with these reports. 
These reports are usually news selections prepared with the use of the media, and are easily 
comprehensible, short and concentrate on the essence. Information included in these reports 
do not undergo analysis and assessment, thus these reports are not prepared on the basis of the 
intelligence cycle.
As for the daily intelligence reports, Hulnick is partly right, but there is some analysis 
and assessment work in these reports as well, because selection also takes place on the basis 
of the constant request for information of policy makers, and the analysis and assessment 
procedures also appear in the method of systematisation and selection of the pieces of 
information, because they place the information in space and time.
The intelligence cycle does not contain feedback
During the analysis of the intelligence cycle, Lowenthal asserts that an important 
element is missing from the classical version of the cycle: the system of feedbacks. This has 
to be present not only among the different structural elements of the intelligence service, but 
on the part of policy makers as well, because Lowenthal thinks (based on American 
examples) that there is no sufficient feedback from the part of politicians.
Although the classical intelligence cycle does not depict the system of feedbacks, but 
the system between the structural elements of intelligence would not work if there were no 
interaction between them. The direction of data collectors can also be viewed as feedback. As
for the users (namely the policy makers) Lowenthal is right, because they react very rarely to 
the products of intelligence. Feedbacks are usually only negative. However, this problem does 
not hinder the operation of the intelligence cycle.
The intelligence process cannot be described by a simple cycle
According to Lowenthal, one of the main problems of the intelligence cycle is that it is 
too simplified and one-dimensional, and that the cycle does not ensure the system of 
feedbacks. Lowenthal thinks that as a result of feedbacks and intervention by policy makers, 
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intelligence is a multi-dimensional, complex, and not a cyclical, but linear process, consisting 
of defined stages. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian worded their own point of view in connection 
with this, which viewpoint aimed at demolishing the barriers of the intelligence cycle. 
According to the two authors, several factors (they called them challenges) have to be taken 
into consideration that the intelligence cycle cannot manage, for instance the risk-based 
approach, the bureaucratic political system, the interactivity, the comparative analysis, the 
covert and clandestine actions, the technological development and the supervision of 
intelligence. After analysing the factors, Gill and Phythian suggests the move towards the 
direction of a more complex, web-based intelligence. In his study, Hulnick focuses on the 
description of the intelligence process as a matrix-based model.
In my opinion, the exaggerated (matrix-based or web-based) intelligence cycle would 
have a result that the cycle would no longer be a general theory, but a method specialised for 
the given activity system of an intelligence service. However, critics are right in stating that 
the intelligence cycle is a simplified model of the process of intelligence.
As technology developed, the process of intelligence became much more complex
Julian Richard formulated the suggestion that also appeared on the part of Warner, Gill 
and Phythian, that the exponential development of technology, as an effect of information 
society, is much more perceptible in the case of intelligence, because the basis of intelligence 
is information. Technological development affected the flow of information and resulted in 
the rearrangement of the disciplines of intelligence. The role of open source intelligence 
(OSINT) became more important, and the cyber intelligence (CYBINT) also appeared, and 
the intelligence services still do not know what to do with the latter. Aaron Brantly37 also 
draws attention to cyberspace when examining the intelligence cycle, because he thinks the 
cycle cannot operate sufficiently in this field. In cyberspace, quick actions and reflections 
against attacks have a significant role.
In my opinion, as an old discipline of intelligence, OSINT is an integrated part of the 
data collection stage of the intelligence cycle, although it received a bigger emphasis than 
before, and sometimes it is able to ensure the required data alone. However, in the case of 
OSINT, one must be careful not to let intelligence become one-sided, since there is still a 
need for the data and the information collected by the other disciplines of intelligence to 
37 Aaron Bart ley earned his PhD at the University of Georgia, where he engaged himself in international 
relations. He served at the United States Peace Corps in Ukraine, then worked as a consultant at the organization 
during the Arab Spring.
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maintain an efficient and productive work. However, the case of CYBINT is different, 
because it is essentially not an information gathering discipline of intelligence; as for its 
function, it can rather be compared to covert and clandestine actions.
The five elements of the cycle do not cover the process of intelligence because some 
elements are missing.
Kristan Wheaton38 examined the stages of the intelligence cycle and their content in 
the different strategies, doctrines and educational materials of different intelligence services. 
He found that in U.S. literature, the intelligence cycle consists of four-six stages, and these
have altogether 19 different elements. Only the stage of data collection was present in every 
version. However, these elements can be compared to the five stages of the classical 
intelligence cycle. The first stage is characterised by requests, needs, control and design. The 
second stage unanimously consists of data collection. The third stage is characterised by 
processing, evaluation, summarising and explanation. The fourth stage consists of analysis 
and the preparation of reports, while the fifth can be characterised by dissemination, 
utilization, integration and feedback.
In the literature, besides the fundamental concepts, new elements or stages occur in the 
intelligence cycle, which did not form parts of the classical version. These include the filling 
of the data stores and databases, utilization and application, and the execution of action. When 
examining the content of the new stages, one finds that these all have been parts of the 
intelligence cycle, where they have been a part of one of the stages. For instance, the filling of 
data stores and databases takes place in the stage of data processing and systematisation, 
while utilization, application and the execution of action can be connected to dissemination, 
but these do not directly form a part of the intelligence cycle because they depend on the 
decision of the user.
38 Kristan J. Wheaton is an associate professor at Mercyhurst University in Erie, Pennsylvania, where he teaches 
intelligence studies. He served in the U.S. Army, where he specialized in security problems, analysis and 
assessment methods and game theory. He was a military attaché in Europe, and worked for the intelligence 
departments of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe.
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Conclusions
The researchers of the theory of intelligence consider the above-mentioned ten 
problems as the criticism of the intelligence cycle. Most of the critics deal with the practice of 
intelligence, because they do not criticise fundamental theoretical questions. It might seem 
from my answers to these criticisms that I would like to protect the intelligence cycle, but this 
is not the case, because I agree that it does not cover fully the practice. However, I think that 
the cycle is a theoretical reflection of the intelligence process, and not its practical realisation. 
In this regard, I partly agree with Robert M. Clark, who said that the intelligence cycle 
became rather a theoretical concept than a practical tool. However, Clark thinks that the gap 
between the theory and the practice is growing, but in my opinion, the theory and the practice 
should be examined from different viewpoints. For instance, in the case of practice, it is the 
problems, the mistakes, the errors and the characteristics within intelligence that cause the 
deviation from the intelligence cycle. When examining the mistakes in intelligence [as I 
elaborated on the topic in my study entitled .RUV]HUĦHOHP]Ę-pUWpNHOĘHOMiUiVRNDONDOPD]iVD
a hírszerzésben (The Use of Modern Analysis and Assessment Methods in Intelligence) 1], it 
can be stated that most of the mistakes of intelligence is caused by the deviation from the 
intelligence cycle; for instance, the lack of the sharing of information. As for the intelligence 
cycle, one can state that on the theoretical level, the intelligence services still operate along 
the lines of this method. The difference between the theory and the practice is that the theory 
provides a framework for the efficient and productive operation of a given intelligence 
service, but during the practice, the possibilities, the capabilities and the situation of the 
service have to be taken into consideration, because the activities of an intelligence service 
employing thousands of people cannot be compared to that of a service employing a few 
hundred employees. The activity systems of intelligence services, and within that, the 
elements of the process and the relationship of the structural elements evolved through several 
decades, thus they can only be altered when some paradigm changes take place in the 
intelligence services.
In my opinion, the intelligence cycle continues to provide a sufficient theoretical 
support to the professional activities of intelligence services, thus it remains a key element of 
efficiently training the intelligence personnel. However, I think that it is necessary to further 
analyse the above problems to improve the Hungarian theory of intelligence.
1 Dr. Csaba Vida: .RUV]HUĦHOHP]Ę-pUWpNHOĘHOMiUiVRNDONDOPD]iVDDKtUV]HU]pVEHQ, pp. 77-86.
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